The conditions of civilizational borrowing, the principles of selectivity and the emergent qualities of civilizational synthesis are examined with reference to medieval Muslim conceptions of state and society. The article highlights the features of pristine Islam which invited the political thought of other civilizations, or more precisely, the Indian science of government and Greek political science. With the cultural integration of Iran into the Muslim caliphate, especially after the 'Abbasid revolution in the mideighth century, the Indian borrowing via the Middle Persian translation emerged as an integral part of the Arabic and Persian literature on statecraft. The reception of Greek political science was a part of the translation of Greek philosophy and medicine into Arabic a century later, and was developed into the discipline of practical philosophy or political science. Through the mutual accommodation of the shari`a and a political culture derived from Greek and Perso-Indian sources, the civilizational encounters under consideration introduced an unmistakable element of pluralism -or at any rate, dualism -in the normative order of medieval Islam. keywords: civilizational encounters ✦ Islam and politics ✦ medieval state ✦ political culture
case study highlights two features of civilization as a macro-level unit of analysis.
First, not only does it transcend units such as 'society' and 'nation-state' in terms of social space, but it has the quality of temporal transcendence. This latter quality makes civilizations -or more strictly speaking, elements thereof -capable of inter-epochal transposition as well as intersocietal transmission. Both features stem from the universality or universalizability of value-ideas and generality or generalizability of symbolic systems, discourse and institutions that comprise a civilization (Nelson, 1981: 90-2) .
Second, 'civilizational complexes', to use Nelson's felicitous phrase, are highly differentiated but nevertheless culturally and historically integrated. Institutions and ideas that constitute these complexes can be transplanted singly or selectively. The integrated whole is, however, also capable of assuming an identity, of being reified. This can occur vis-a-vis 'the other' -which is why every civilization has its barbarians. It should be noted, however, that the reification of a civilization is not exclusively or primarily a phenomenon of self-congratulation and arrogance of power. The holistic conception and reification of a civilization typically occur in civilizational encounters. Those who reject the importation of institutions and ideas typically see them as incapable of detachment from the alien mother civilization as a whole -as did the traditionalists who rejected Greek philosophy in medieval Islam. But the same holistic conception of a foreign civilization as superior to one's own can be offered by the enthusiasts for its importation, as by converts to other world religions. Such a reification was certainly the basis of the advocacy of westernization as the wholesale importation of the western civilization by the Russian elite since Peter the Great, and by the elites of the Ottoman Empire, Iran and Japan in the 19th century. A similarly holistic image of the West as the home of the free market and democracy has been at work in post-Soviet countries since 1989.
The holistic conception of civilization entails its 'dedifferentiation' (Tiryakian, 1985) and the highlighting of its perceived fundamentals as the focal point of transformative or oppositional social action, and tends to ignore its complexity and possibilities for selective adaptation. While Nelson's (1981) idea of 'civilizational encounter' emphasizes complexity, differentiation and therefore selective adaptation, Huntington's (1996) notion of 'clash of civilizations' presumes the holistic conception. As we shall see later, both the fact of complexity of civilization and the temptation to its holistic reification play a part in the dynamics of our case of inter-epochal and intersocietal encounters between the Islamic civilization and the Greek and Indian ones.
I
The two much older civilizations which flanked the emergent Islamic civilization in late antiquity -the Hellenistic and the Indian -had independently developed fundamentally different political ideas. 1 Indian statecraft -my term for arthashāstra (more literally, the art/science/craft of government/the polity/the useful) -probably developed roughly in the same period as Greek political science, reaching its culmination in the Arthashāstra attributed to Aristotle's contemporary, Kautilya. 2 India saw the birth of statecraft as a technical science of government whose advocates ranked it with the Vedas in the list of sciences, with the more passionate going so far as to consider it superior. This science reached maturity in the late fourth century BCE with Kautilya's great work, Arthashāstra. Whereas the Brahminic tradition had covered rudiments of government and public administration as the moral duty of the person of the king (rājadharma), the subject of the new technical science with its own original categories was the security and prosperity of the polity through rational government by the king. With Kautilya's synthesis, statecraft was separated from the religious learning and became an independent science (Ghoshal, 1959: 12-13, 82-102) .
Statecraft elaborated reasons of state as pertaining to the sphere of artha (wealth and utility) as distinct from and independent of the religio-moral sphere of dharma (virtue and duty). Despite its striking amorality (especially decried in the Buddhist literature for making it the dismal science among 'the lower arts'), much of the science of government, as appropriate for the normative regulation of the political economy, the domain of artha, was incorporated into the smriti ('law') of Manu and the other canonical smritis such as the Mahābhāratā (Ghoshal, 1959: 65, 103) . The Brahminical tradition thus acknowledged much of the content of statecraft as part of the Hindu law as rājadharma (duty of the king), conceived as 'sufficiently elastic to comprise a whole body of principles and policies of government based exclusively upon the needs and requirements of the king's administration' (Ghoshal, 1959: 13) .
The most ancient of the dharmasātras had, by the fourth century BCE or earlier, already assigned two functions to the king as his special dharma: to protect and to punish. The taxes were due to him for doing his duty of protecting the people against disturbers of public peace. While the Brahmins would instruct the people on expiatory penance necessary for purification after committing a crime, the enforcement of penalties was the essential prerogative of the king. He had the right to fix the punishment as he deemed fit (Lingat, 1973: 66-7) . Statecraft identified punishment (danda) with law and made it a divine institution as well as the foremost principle of government. Application of danda (the rod or staff of the king) was essential for the maintenance of order, and necessary for holding the barriers to corruption and intermixture of the castes which constituted the social hierarchy (Kautilya, 1987: 15.1.8, 9; p. 101) . The idea was passed through Kautilya to the Brahminical canon (Ghoshal, 1959: 167-9, 255; Lingat, 1973: 208) . Dandanīti (science of punishment/law enforcement), an integral part of arthashāstra, was thus attributed to Brahmā himself, and came to be used as a synonym for statecraft. The duty of protection was stretched to include arbitration in business affairs (vyarahāra), and a small place was carved for civil law on the margin of the rājadharma (Lingat, 1973: 68-70) .
Kautilya defines statecraft -the science of wealth and welfare 'by which territory is acquired and maintained' -also as the science of upholding the social order by just punishment (dandanīti) (Kautilya, 1987: 15.1.1, 2; pp. 100, 105) . The treasury is the state's means for achieving both dharma (virtue) and kama (enjoyment) (Kautilya, 1987: 8.1.41-52; p. 125) . 'From the treasury/wealth [kosha] comes state power [danda] . With the treasury and the army (together [koshadanda] ) the earth is acquired with the treasury as the ornament' (Kautilya, 1987: 2.12.37; p. 254) . However, the treasury and the army, as well as fortified cities 'all depend on the people' (Kautilya, 1987: 8.1.28; p. 124) . Therefore, it follows that the promotion of the people's prosperity is the king's duty. 'Hence the king shall be ever active in the management of the economy' (Kautilya, 1987: 1.9.34-5; p. 149) .
Arthashāstra contains not only a rationalized system of fines and punishments in great detail but also extensive rules for diplomacy, warfare, systematic employment of spies, techniques of deceit and treachery and devices for sowing dissension among cohesive domestic groups as well as external enemies. These 'Machiavellian' rules and techniques, all justified by reasons of state, bring out the inevitable tension between statecraft and the religio-ethical branches of learning from which it had become detached. Nevertheless, Kautilya also made a significant contribution to the Indian judiciary system by endowing the king's edicts (rāja-shāsana) with the force of law. The royal edict is presented as one of the four sources of law or bases of justice, and the one which is decisive in actual litigation. The king was urged to apply both dharma and artha in litigation. He could consult the other sources of law as well as reason (nyāya) and arrive at a rational determination of righteousness (dharma) even in contradiction to the texts of the legal science (Kautilya, 1987: 3.1.43-5; p. 380; Derrett, 1999: 166, 201 ). The king thus had legislative power, and his edict, either establishing a new or declaring an existing law which was in doubt, was often inscribed on a stone pillar erected in an important public space.
A new literary genre for the expression of the precepts of statecraft in animal fables emerged in the early centuries of the Common Era. The most important example of this literary genre in Sanscrit is the Pañchatantra (the Five Books) whose author salutes the six 'makers of the kingly science', including Manu and Chānakya (i.e. Kautilya) . This kingly science, also called the science of policy, is expressed in a series of fables. The naturalism of the tales of the animal kingdom frees the rules of statecraft from the constraints imposed to bring it into harmony with dharma in the Brahminical canon, and the king's policy is said to take many guises, like a harlot. The divergence of the political expedients of statecraft, which include deceit, from morality becomes more overt. Superiority of intrigue to force as a means of dealing with enemies is constantly emphasized. The emphasis on consultation is pervasive, but the choice of councilors and ministers is made to depend entirely on the success of their counsel and ruses in overcoming the perils of ruling and the fickleness of royal fortune and dealing with the king's enemies in war and diplomacy. Their counsel depends on reasoning, though a purely instrumental reasoning involving deceit, treachery and espionage. The secrecy of counsel is consequently essential for its success (Ghoshal, 1959: 270, 275-91) .
In the civilizational encounter between Iran and India in the sixth century CE, statecraft attracted the attention of the scholars who traveled from Iran to the Indian centers of learning in search of knowledge. According to a medieval source, a late ninth-century local king in the Caspian region of Tabarestan who claimed descent from ancient Persian kings, translated a collection of Pahlavi animal fables known as Marzbān-nāmah so that 'the knowledge of the Indian philosopher, Bidpāi, who compiled the Kalilah va Dimnah, will bite the dust as this collection [will show] the extent of superiority of the Persians upon the people of India and other countries' (cited in Qazvini, 1909: h) . The sentiment was probably shared by the sixth-century author, and reflects a natural hostile reaction to foreign ideas -an instance of a mild 'clash of civilizations' -in which many of the latter are in fact dialectically absorbed.
II
The composite document known as the 'constitution of Medina' marks the foundation of a community (umma) under God, which is unified in matters of common defense and undivided peace, recognizes Muhammad as His Messenger, and invests him with judiciary authority (Denny, 1977) . No provisions, however, were made regarding the form of government either in the 'constitution of Medina' or in the Koran itself. As the conquering Muslims took over the administrative organization of the Sassanian and Byzantine Empires, they also appropriated the normative order of universal monarchy. This normative order was binding on the Muslim and non-Muslim subjects of the caliphate; and it defined the polity without any meaningful reference to the umma (community of believers). The Koranic term umma became a fundamental point of reference for the shari'a, but not for the development of political ethic and public law. It is rarely used in the literature on ethics and statecraft, and has no special political significance.
The bureaucratic class that carried out the fiscal and administrative tasks for the Muslim rulers also translated the Indo-Persian works on statecraft into Arabic. The greatest of translator-bureaucrats was 'Abdallāh b. al-Moqaffa' who translated the Pañchatantra, alongside a massive Epic of Kings, Khodāy-nāmah and several collections of aphorisms on statecraft. The Indian precepts were intermixed with the counsels of the Persian kings in the presentation of the tradition of the ancients. An important tract in this literature, which bears the imprint of the Indian idea of social hierarchy, is attributed to the founder of the Sassanian Empire and is accordingly known as the Ordinance (Ā'in) of Ardashir (de Fouché-cour, 1986: 93-4) . The Ordinance purports to record the act of foundation of order: regulation of the hours of the day, domestic life, dietary and sumptuary regulations, and above all the institution of the social order in the form of (the four) castes. This tract and other works in the early PersoIndian statecraft literature offered a model for what was lacking in the Koran and the 'constitution of Medina': a constitution that regulated the relationship between the ruler and his subjects (ra'iyya), on the one hand, and his viziers and councilors, on the other. This explains why the PersoIndian literature on statecraft was so easily absorbed into the public law of the caliphate and Muslim monarchies and shaped the medieval Muslim conception of government.
It is important to note that the works on statecraft and customs of the ancient kings used the same normative vocabulary as the works of the early jurist, the two key words being sunna (custom or tradition) and sira (manner, way, plural siyar). We know that with the delayed triumph of al-Shafi'i in jurisprudence, these terms were exclusively appropriated for International Sociology Vol. 16 No. 3 the Prophet. But the customs and the traditions of the ancient kings were given a similar normative status by the use of identical vocabulary. The title of History of the Prophets and the Kings (rusul wa'l-mulū k), is attested several times, the most notable being the great universal history by Tabari in the early tenth century.
Independent royal dynasties were established in Iran and in Egypt in the latter part of the ninth century. Pollock's (1998) thesis on the close connection between polity formation and the rise of vernacular languages in 'the vernacular millennium' finds strong support in the promotion of the Persian vernacular by the Samanid dynasty in northern Iran and Transoxania at the end of the ninth and throughout the tenth century. The Samanid state formation went hand in hand with the development of a political ethic based on the Perso-Indian literature of statecraft, which was translated from Arabic and Pahlavi into the dari Persian in the new, Arabic alphabet. Sendbād-nāmah was translated into Persian by a Samanid bureaucrat in the middle of the tenth century, and set in Persian verse by the Samanid court poet, Rūdaki, as was the Kalilah va Dimnah. At the same time, the Shi'ite Buyids from the Caspian provinces captured Baghdad and became the first of a series of secular independent rulers to assume the title of Sultan -and in Iran, Shāhanshāh (king of kings). The bifurcation of sovereignty into caliphate and sultanate was a dramatic expression of the autonomy of the political order in the form of monarchy from the caliphate (Bartold, 1963) . But this autonomy had in fact existed since the last quarter of the ninth century -that is, only a little later than the consolidation of the normative autonomy of the shari'a (sacred law). In other words, from the tenth century onward, the legal order of the caliphate had two normatively autonomous components: monarchy and the shari'a. These may be called the political order and the shar'i order, respectively. This duality is reflected in the medieval literature on statecraft and kingship as a theory of the two powers: prophecy and kingship.
The theory of the two powers, which represented the synthesis between Islam and Perso-Indian statecraft, coexisted with a juristic theory of the caliphate as the apex of the shar'i order, which has received inordinate attention by the Orientalists as representing the Islamic 'constitutional organization' (Gibb, 1955) . This theory found its definitive expression in the 11th century in a legitimist attempt to shore up the authority of the caliph against the growing power of the Buyid and Seljuq sultans. It subordinated the political order to the caliph as the highest authority of the shar'i order. Historically speaking, the juristic theory of the caliphate always coexisted with the political theory of the two powers, and furthermore, its full historical life spanned no more than two centuries. As we see later, with the demise of the caliphate, it gave way to a theory of the sultanate we characterize here as 'Islamic royalism'.
The great Persian classics in statecraft from the second half of the 11th century are the works of an experienced prince, 'Onsor al-Ma'āli Keykāvū s, and the greatest vizier of the Seljuq empire, Nizām al-Molk. In these treatises, Qābūs-nāmah and Siyar al-Molū k, the aphoristic and fable-centered modes of presentation are replaced by systematic treatment of topics in rulership and administration, with many of the examples drawn from recent political and administrative history. Nevertheless, the essential notion of political wisdom as the ruler's pragmatic art of rational government in consultation with ministers and councilors, is taken over from political aphorisms and fully developed. The need for consultation, constantly backed by the famous Koranic injunctions (Koran, 3:159, 42:38) that have in the 20th century been taking as justification of democracy, were interpreted to underscore the importance of wise councilors and competent viziers.
In the generation after Nizām al-Molk, his protégé, the great jurist alGhazāli (d. 1111), who was a major contributor to the juristic theory of the caliphate, incorporated many of the aphorisms of statecraft in his various works (Tabataba'i, 1993: Ch. 3), and added a short mirror for princes to his Persian translation/adaptation of his magnum opus, Ihyā' 'ulūm al-din, the Alchemy of Happiness (Kimiyā-ye sa 'ādat). This tract was published with a much larger second part as the Nasihat al-Molū k, which was already attributed to Ghazāli in the 12th century, and affirms the theory of dual power: 'Know and understand that God has chosen two categories of persons, placing them above all the world: the prophets and the kings. The prophets are sent for the salvation of humankind, the kings, for the maintenance of order' (Ghazāli, 1988: 81; Lambton, 1981: 120-1) . The theory of the two powers was epitomized in the maxim: 'kingship and prophecy are two jewels on the same ring' (Arjomand, 2001b) .
With the absorption of the Perso-Indian literature, the centrality of punishment was carried over from Indian statecraft and deeply colored the Muslim conception of government, so much so that the same term, siyāsat, which etymologically meant the disciplining of camels and cattle, and by extension, of the subjects (Lane, 1863 : Vol. 1, 1465 , came to mean policy as well as punishment. The bureaucrat who translated Kalilah va Dimnah in the mid-12th century with an elaborate preface attributed an important precept of the Arthashāstra to Ardashir in a famous adage: 'there is no kingdom except through men, and no men except through wealth and no wealth except through cultivation ['imāra] and no cultivation except through justice and punishment [siyāsa]'. Wealth is the means for conquering the world, and justice and punishment are the elixir of wealth. Peace and security of roads and the preservation of the realm depend on punishment. Hence the priority of justice and punishment in the ethic of the kings (Nasrallāh Monshi, 1998: 21) .
In the 13th and 14th centuries, the theory of dual power was somewhat modified. The fundamental distinction between the political order and the shar'i order did not disappear but was accommodated within the framework of the ideal type that I will call 'Islamic royalism'. According to Islamic royalism, the ruler (sultan) maintained both the political and the shar'i order; was therefore the Shadow of God on earth and the 'king [pādshāh] of Islam'. A collection of early aphorisms on statecraft, attributed to Indian, Greek and Persian sages, many of whom (including 'Sindbad the wise') are named, and compiled at the beginning of the 13th century, already contains a typical statement of it: 'Kingship [pādshāhi] is . . . the deputyship [khelāfat] of God Most High on Earth. If it does not contradict divine command and the Prophetic prescription, and if justice and equity is exercised in kingship . . . its degree will be equal to the rank of prophecy ' (Tuhfat al-Molūk, 1938: 62) . Writing in support of the Khwā razmshā h's serious challenge to the suzerainty of the caliph in the 1180s, the Shafi'ite jurist and philosopher, Fakhr al-Din Rāzi ignores the 'Abbasid caliph and considers the king the deputy of God immediately: 'The order of the world is impossible without the existence of the king [pādshāh]; hence it is evident that the king is God's Caliph ' (de Fouché-cour, 1986: 426) . Rāzi, it should be noted, adopted the form of Greek practical philosophy and its division into ethics, economics and civic politics for the presentation of his ideas on government in an encyclopedia of 60 sciences. He also drew on the pseudo-Aristotelian Secretum Secretorum to depict the subordination of the shar'i order to the political order in the form of a circle drawn with eight segments, each containing an aphorism:
The world is a garden whose gardener is the dynastic state [dawlat]; the state is an authority [sultān] whose guardian is the sacred law [shari'at]: the sacred law is a policy [siyāsat] which preserves the kingdom; the kingdom is a polity which the army brings into existence; the army is guaranteed by wealth; wealth is acquired from the subjects; the subjects are made servants by justice; justice is the axis of the well-being of the world. (Rāzi, 1905: 207) The first three segments represent Rāzi's royalist accommodation of the shar'i order while the other five incorporate an old maxim of the PersoIndian statecraft.
After the overthrow of the caliphate, Rāzi's claim on behalf of kings gained universal acceptance, and kings added caliph as well as sultan to their titles. The 'Abbasid caliphate did have an afterlife, a particularly long one in India, where coins kept being minted in the names of dead and living shadow caliphs being maintained by the Mamluks in Egypt, and survived as a symbol into the 20th century. But it became devoid of significance for public law. Monarchy was henceforth derived independently from God. The ruler maintained order in the world; he was therefore God's Arjomand Perso-Indian and Greek Influence on Muslim Government caliph or representative on earth. The fundamental principle of the new Islamic royalism was that the ruler (sultān) maintained both the political and the shar'i order; was therefore the Shadow of God on earth, and the 'king of Islam'. Islamic royalism became the typical polity for the TurkoMongolian period: from 1258 to 1500 (Arjomand, 2001b) .
III
The synthesis Islam and statecraft in the preface to Kalilah va Dimnah contains a hint at a third element in medieval Muslim political ethic when the author mentions the needs of 'the middling people' with regard to 'the disciplining/management [siyāsat] of the self, the household and the dependents' (Nasrallāh Monshi, 1998: 21) As was pointed out, the PersoIndian statecraft offered a source for the normative regulation of the political order that was freely drawn upon and reconciled with Islam throughout the eighth and ninth centuries. The translation of Greek philosophy, medicine and astronomy gathered momentum in the ninth century. Plato's Laws, Timaeus and the Republic, and all of Aristotle's major works except Politics were translated, together with much neo-Platonic material attributed to them. The philosophers adopted the term siyāsa from statecraft to denote civic politics (al-siyāsa al-madaniyya). However, in contrast to the well-being and prosperity of the subjects, which were the goals of Persian statecraft, Muslim philosophers offered, as the telos of government, the happiness (sa'āda) of the members of the human association interchangeably termed society and polis (madina).
For the great Muslim philosopher, Abū Nasr al-Fārābi (d. 950), political science was the most important branch of philosophy; at one time, he went so far as to take the position that there was no happiness apart from political/civic happiness (al-sa'āda al-madaniyya). His work is therefore singly the most important channel of transmission of Greek political science into the Islamic civilization. Fārābi used 'civic politics' (al-siyāsa al-madaniyya) synonymously with 'governance' (tadbir) and 'rulership' (riyāsa), and equated the term with the 'royal craft'. The royal craft was defined, without undue rigor, as the combination of the art of political science and the faculty of practical wisdom (Galston, 1990 : 95, note 1). The analogy between statecraft and medicine was taken over by Fārābi from the statecraft literature: the goal of political science is the health of the city as the goal of the medical craft is bodily heath: 'The healer for the bodies is the physician and the healer for the souls is the statesman who is also called the king.' As the physician uses the medical craft to restore health to the body, so the health of the body politic is restored by 'the statesman with the political craft and by the king with the royal craft ' (al-Fārābi, 1993: 24-5, #4) . Furthermore, as with Perso-Indian statecraft, the objective of the royal craft was to bring International Sociology Vol. 16 No. 3 order to the civic community by establishing a hierarchy among the classes of citizens and their respective activities (Galston, 1990: 135) .
One element of Fārābi's political theory, however, appears regressive in comparison to the theory of dual power in the statecraft literature. In Civic Politics (cited in Galston, 1990: 67) , revelation is presented as the union of the prophet with the Agent Intellect, which therefore endows him with the power 'to define things and actions that direct people toward happiness'. Elsewhere, too, Fārābi conjoins governance and prophecy (alFārābi, 1968: 44; Galston, 1990: 94) . The distinction between the prophet, the supreme ruler and the true king is completely blurred in the image of the ideal leader of the people to happiness in the City of Excellence. The practitioner of the royal art or political science appears, above all, as the technician of happiness who orders society and the lives of the citizens and 'should inquire into everything given by the celestial bodies' (Lerner and Mahdi, 1963: 40) .
Fārābi edited Plato's Laws and wrote a commentary on Aristotle's Ethics. Despite his knowledge of the Aristotelian conception of politics from the last chapter of Ethics, Fārābi decisively turned the focus of political science away from the notions of 'public interest' and 'equality [of the ruler and the ruled] before the law' and unto the master idea of 'happiness', whose achievement had little to do with the deliberations of citizens but was rather a technical matter best left to the ideal ruler and his expert advisors. Aristotle's sharp contrast between the king and the statesman, which derives from his fundamental conception of the rule of law, is completely lost. Fārābi, as we have seen, simply equates the two terms 'king' (malik) and 'statesman' (madani). For Aristotle (1962 Aristotle ( : 1252a , in contrast to the uncontrolled authority of the former, the latter 'exercises his authority in conformity with the rules imposed by the political craft and as one who rules and is ruled in turn' (emphasis added). Furthermore, unlike the authority of the king and the master over slaves, 'the authority of the statesman is an authority over freemen and equals' 5 (Aristotle, 1962 (Aristotle, : 1255a . There is a corresponding loss of the concept of 'common interest' in contrast to 'despotic' interest of the master who rules over slaves, and of Aristotle's (1962 Aristotle's ( : 1279a emphasis that 'only those constitutions which consider the common interest are right constitutions, judged by the standards of absolute justice'.
It is true that Fārābi also offers a more realistic typology of the inferior cities, including democracies, which was developed by Averroes (d. 1198) almost to the point of regenerating Aristotelian political science. Nevertheless, his political alchemy of happiness closed the Aristotelian window and left the gate of Muslim philosophy wide open to the temptation of neo-Platonic emanationism, according to which God's attributes descended upon the earthly ruler (Arjomand, 2001b) .
Two Iranian philosophers who sought to synthesize Greek political science and Persian statecraft are of particular interest from our perspective. Abū 'l-Hasan al-'Ā meri al-Nishābū ri (d. 991) discarded Fārābi's dedifferentiation of prophecy and kingship for the dual theory of Persian statecraft, which, incidentally, allowed for a more harmonious reconciliation of Islam and philosophy. In the chapter on 'the excellence of Islam in relation to kingship' in his Virtues of Islam (al-'Ā meri al-Nishābū ri, 1967: 152) , 'Ā meri considers prophecy and kingship the two institutions fundamental for the preservation of the world:
There is no authority in learning and wisdom higher than prophecy. There is no higher authority in power and majesty than kingship. . . . It is related from Moses when addressing his people: 'Remember the favor [God] bestowed upon you when He made prophets appear among you, and made you kings'. (Koran, 5: 20) 'Ā meri goes even further and tries to reconcile religious jurisprudence and statecraft based on political science in view of the overlap between the religious and political spheres (al-'Ā meri al-Nishābū ri, 1967: 119) . The key to this reconciliation is the idea of rational religion, rationality being the quality taken to establish the superiority of Islam over other religions. He divides virtues into three kinds corresponding to the tripartite division of practical philosophy into the governance of the soul (ethics), of the household (economics) and of the city (political science). The use of a Persian term, kadkhodhāniyya, for household management evokes the estate management of the Persian landed nobility in his native Khorāsān, and is fully in line with 'Ā meri's project for a grand synthesis of political ideas that include Persian statecraft and practical philosophy as well as Islam. To the latter end, he had already produced a collection of Persian, Indian and Greek political aphorisms, which included long quotations from Plato (Badawi, 1974: 151-61) .
'Ā meri's reading of Islam as rational religion is analogically extended by his compatriot 'Ali b. Moskū yah (Miskawayh) (d. 1030) to the conception of Persian, Indian, Greek and Roman political ethics and norms of statecraft as 'Eternal Wisdom', the title of his treatise. In line with the idea of natural, civic religion, 'eternal wisdom' is conceived as rational/natural political ethics, which is therefore universal. The pluralist epistemology of this convert from Zoroastrianism granted equal validity to Persian, Indian, Greek and Arab expressions of Sophia Perennis. Ibn Moskū yah's Purification of Ethics is a faithful rendering of Aristotle's Ethics in Arabic. Happiness is possible only in society and through civic virtues and the pursuit of common goods. Ibn Moskū yah sharply diverges from Persian statecraft regarding the centrality of punishment in monarchy, and explicitly rejects domination based on force in favor of Sociology Vol. 16 No. 3 patrimonial rule based on love and affection. Like God, the king should be kind and merciful, and 'the relationship between the king and the subject must be a paternal relationship, that of the subject to the king, filial, and that among the subjects, fraternal ' (Tahdhib, 146, cited in Tabataba'i, 1994: 163-4) .
International
However, Ibn Moskū yah's conception of rulership and political science did not free itself from the Farabian idea of production of happiness as the craft of the ideal ruler. 'The ruler of the city' is the leader who guides his people through the rational sciences. He is the successor of the Lawgiver who guards the Law (shari'a) and protects its foundation. 'He is the Imam and his craft is the kingly craft [sanā'at al-mulk]' (Tahdhib, 141, cited in Tabataba'i, 1994: 161) . At this critical point of his synthesis, Ibn Moskū yah follows Fārābi's collapsing of the king and the statesman and turns to the political ethic of Persian patrimonial statecraft and elaborates the relationship between the king and his subjects rather than those among free citizens.
The classical Muslim political science culminates in the Akhlāq-e Nāseri, a Persian translation of Ibn Moskū yah's Purification of Ethics, which extended its governance of the soul (ethics) and of the household (economics) by a section on civic politics. This last section incorporated some of the writings of Fārā bi and Ibn Sinā , as well as the older aphorisms of Ibn al-Moqaffa'. Tū si follows Ibn Moskū yah in considering love an important factor in social solidarity, which makes the relationship between the ruler and the subjects paternal and that among subjects fraternal (Tū si, 1990: 269) . He also develops (Tū si, 1990: 207-21, 254, 307-8) the Aristotelian notion of 'the common good'. In a later tract, he even applies it to royal finances, making a distinction between the personal and the public royal revenue and expenditure (Arjomand, 2001b) . But the determination of the common good is left to the head of the household in economics, and to the king as the head of the polity who orders diversity into unity as the shadow of God (Tū si, 1990: 148) . In a major effort at synthesis, Tū si also incorporates the political ethic of patrimonial kingship into his political science. The common analogy between the monarch and God is not missing (Tū si, 1990: 139) . The ruler, who is distinguished from other men by the divine inspiration required for rational government, is called 'king' by the ancients, 'Imam' by the jurists and 'statesman' by Aristotle -so Tū si alleges, following the Farabian confusion of king and statesman (Tū si, 1990: 253) . Whereas his earlier general discussion of justice had followed Aristotle, when he now turns to the topic in the chapter on statecraft and kingship, which is immediately followed by the need for spies in statecraft, the Greek spirit is subordinated to the ethos of the Perso-Indian social hierarchy (Tū si, 1990: 307-11) .
IV
From the very beginning of its importation in the latter part of the ninth and early tenth century, the proponents of philosophy, which included the Greek political theories, had to face the challenge of revealed religion to philosophy, and sought to reconcile the two. Fārābi took 'the acquisition of happiness' to extend beyond this world to the attainment of salvation in the next. Nevertheless, his inclination toward the holistic conception of Greek philosophy resulted in the presentation of religion as an imitation of philosophy as the means for the attainment of supreme happiness (Galston, 1990: 43-7) , which was in turn developed into the distinctive Muslim philosophical theory of prophecy (Rahman, 1958) , and posed a thinly veiled challenge to Revelation as the fundamental premise of Islam. 6 Rational legitimation of religion is the philosophical theory which was a potential challenge to the traditional legitimacy of the shar'i order. This made a clash between Islam and Greek philosophy, including political theory, inevitable, and a rejectionist civilizational response by the pious traditionalists gathered momentum and eventually displaced philosophy to the margin of institutionalized learning.
This long and complex Kulturkampf, considered the most fateful in the history of Islamic civilization by many, cannot be discussed here, and I must confine myself to the rejectionist civilizational response only with regard to political ideas. While the 'Abbasid caliphate survived, though seriously weakened during 'the Shi'ite Century' (Hodgson, 1974: Vol. 2, 36-9) , the rejectionist response was formulated by the jurists who proposed to revive the institution of the caliphate with a program of Shari'abased government. They developed a theory of the caliphate as a branch of Islamic jurisprudence. In terms of our dichotomy, this theory realistically allowed for the possibility of 'authority by seizure', but advocated the subordination of the political to the shar'i order under the suzerainty of the caliph. The Chief Kadi of Baghdad, al-Māwardi, perhaps the best known of these jurists, did not see this branch of Islamic jurisprudence as incompatible with statecraft, and in fact tried his hand at writing a tract in that genre on 'The Laws [qawānin] of the Vizierate and Statecraft [siyāsat al-mulk] '. Ghazāli, the leading figure in the rejection of philosophy, also practiced the new genre of caliphal jurisprudence early in his career (Lambton, 1981: 107-17) , but must have recognized its limits. The choice of words for the title of his great book on ethics in Persian cannot have been accidental. By using the key term of the philosophers in his Elixir of Happiness, he clearly meant to appropriate the field of ethics and civil politics for the jurists. He evidently did not find Persian statecraft nearly as threatening as Greek political science, and followed Māwardi in drawing on it to supplement the theory of Shari'a-based government. After the overthrow of the 'Abbasid caliphate by the Mongols, the political ideas of the 11th-century caliphal legitimists inspired the Siyāsa al-shar'iyya (Sharia-based politics or policy) by Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), who lived in Syria and wrote in the face of the triple threat of the Mongols, the Shi'ites and the Crusaders.
The science of civic politics, as was pointed out, reached its peak in Tū si's Ethics, already subordinating its Greek form to the spirit of PersoIndian statecraft. From then on, it merged with statecraft, facing its programmatic Islamic counterpart of theories of shar'i government which may in fact have been increasingly accommodated (Tabataba'i, 1994: Ch. 9 ). The Muslim synthesis of Perso-Indian statecraft and Greek political science was thus complete, and henceforth found expression in variants of the theories of the two powers. The later centuries were times of insignificant change, and the theory of the two powers survived into our era. During the Iranian constitutional revolution, Shaykh Fazlallāh Nū ri justified the restoration of absolute monarchy in 1907 with a restatement of the theory of the two powers (Zargarinezhād, 1998: 163) .
V
At the beginning of this article, I mentioned the holistic temptation to reject the fact of differentiated historic civilizations for the totalistic conception of civilization, which dedifferentiate it to what is seen as its fundamentals. The reified concept of the West, as was pointed out, became the social myth of the modernizing elite of the Ottoman Empire and Iran in the 19th century. In the 20th century, it stimulated the dispossessed traditional or 'organic' intellectuals of Muslim societies to formulate an Islamic countermyth of their own. The political edge of this alternative Islamic social myth became increasingly sharpened as the century was drawing to a close. The late 20th-century 'political Islam' obliterated the theory of the two powers from an increasingly reified and holistic historical memory, and discovered a hero in Ibn Taymiyya, whose apprehension of the aforementioned triple threat matches their fear of suffocation by the western cultural invasion. Ibn Taymiyya's monistic idea of 'Shar'ia-based policy' was simplified still further into a vehemently rejectionist, anti-western myth of the 'Islamic state' with the primary function of the execution of the divine law.
The fact that the myth of the Islamic state matches the reified and holistic picture of the enemy civilization drawn by Huntington does not make it a historical reality. The salient aspect of the historical reality we have analyzed in this article is rather the differential reception of Perso-Indian and Greek political ideas in Islam. The simplest explanation of this differential absorption into the Muslim conception of government is the historical continuity with ancient Iran, which made monarchy a political reality from the ninth century onward (and had strongly influenced the conception of the Caliphate much earlier), whereas the Greek or even the Hellenistic polis had long ceased to exist. Nor could the Greek idea of polis, faithfully rendered as madina, have any 'demonstration effect' as the Byzantine Empire was by then a Christian monarchy. Its impact depended on the transhistorical property of the Greek civilizational complex, which made possible its intersocietal transmission and rediscovery in medieval Islam and medieval Christianity. Such intercivilizational transmission would, however, be inevitably selective. The fact that the Muslim philosophers from Fārābi to Tū si took monarchy for granted, as I have tried to show, critically affected their reading of Aristotle and can therefore account for some of their omissions.
This explanation can be supplemented by a single historical fact of great importance. Tū si and the Muslim philosophers lacked knowledge of Aristotle's Politics (Brague, 1993) . They therefore mistook the Republic of 'the divine Plato' as the natural extension of Aristotle's Ethics (Averroes, 1974: 4) , with the consequent loss of many key Aristotelian political concepts that shaped western political thought. The reception of Greek philosophy by the Muslims was incomplete, and left out the central Aristotelian political conception of common interest as determined by the deliberation by citizens who constituted the ruler and the ruled at the same time. This glaring omission is one of the greatest puzzles in the history of Islamic civilization. It raises the theoretically critical counterfactual question: 'What if Aristotle's Politics had been translated into Arabic?' (And why was it not translated as it was accessible to those who translated Aristotle's other works?) If Politics had been available, it may have paved the way for detaching the idea of the rule of law and public interest from monarchy and the shar'i order alike. Would Nasir al-Din Tū si, who died a year before Thomas Aquinas in 1274 and is, incidentally, credited with the anticipation of Copernicus in astronomy (Huff, 1993: 55-9) , not have been able to reconcile the Aristotelian conception of politics with Islam as Aquinas reconciled it with Christianity? The metaphysical metamorphosis of public interest into happiness by Fārābi was perhaps both the consequence and the cause of the Muslim neglect of Aristotle's Politics. With the omission of the Aristotelian conception of politics, Persian norms came to constitute the substance of the political theory of Tū si and his epigone, Greek practical philosophy its form.
The conception of the divine law as the source of authority in the shar'i order -already in place by the time Fārābi produced a Muslim version of Greek political science -was a greater obstacle to the reception of philosophy than the Christian conception of canon law as the law that derived its authority from that of the church as the mystical body of Christ (Peters, 1982) . The contrast can partly explain the divergence in the reception of Aristotle and political trajectories of medieval Islamic and West European civilizations. This divergence was considerable, but not as sharp as it became in modern times. A traveler equipped with our survey of IndoPersian statecraft and Greco-Muslim division of practical philosophy into ethics, economics and the craft of civic government would still find himself fairly comfortably at home in the political culture of Renaissance Italy (Springborg, 1992: Ch. 18 ) and of late 16th-century France (Foucault, 1991: 90-8) , except for Bodin's presentation of the public character of sovereignty on the basis of Aristotle's Politics. By the end of the 18th century, however, the trajectories of political evolution in the Islamic and western civilizations had been pushed much wider apart by two developments in the West: the absolutist state and of capitalism, which brought a new notion of rational government-based 'statistics' and 'policy' (police, Polizei) (Foucault, 1991) , and the democratic revolutions, which vastly expanded the scope of the Aristotelian notions of common good and equality before the law.
Notes
1. Al-Azmeh (1997) emphasizes similarities in the conception and enunciations of power across different civilizations. My focus is, by contrast, on the axiological differences which can account for divers arrangements of the same or similar traits in fundamentally different configurations. 2. As the two approaches to politics developed separately and did not have an impact on Islam until a millennium later, relative chronology of these independent developments is not relevant to our purpose, and we consider the two in the order of their respective importation into the Islamic civilization. 3. So did astrology, supported by the most advanced arithmetic of the era, whose political edge was sharpened in the Islamic civilization (Arjomand, 2001a) . 4. The book was translated from Syriac to Greek, and from Arabic and Hebrew to Latin. All its tales were later incorporated into the Thousand and One Nights. 5. In Kitāb al-Milla va Nusūs Ukhra, al-Fārābi (1968: 63, #20) suggests that individuals in the social hierarchy both obey the authority of those above them and exercise their own authority over those below them, but there is no sense of equality before the law. In fact, social hierarchy is immediately said to be an extension of the universe, with God as its manager (mudabbir) and the immediate superior and prototype of the monarch. 6. This challenge is especially clear in the definition of religious sciences and jurisprudence as civic crafts by Fārābi (Lerner and Mahdi, 1963: 27) and al-'Ā meri (1967: 119) .
